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PhilosoPhy and Theology
The­ethics­of­fetal­surgery­raises­numerous­questions.­In­this­reflection,­I­would­
like to consider only three of them. Is the fetal human being a “patient” and, if so, 
under­what­conditions?­Why­does­the­“reduction”­of­a­twin­pregnancy­to­one­baby­
cause­such­difficulty­for­defenders­of­abortion?­Is­it­morally­permissible­to­prevent­
a dying fetal twin from bringing about the death or serious injury of a healthy fetal 
twin­by­means­of­umbilical­cord­occlusion?­
Arguably the most prominent scholars exploring the ethical questions about 
fetal surgery are Frank A. Chervenak and Laurence B. McCullough. In a series of 
books and articles, they have established themselves as the foremost authorities in 
the­area.­How­do­they­answer­the­first­and­fundamental­question­about­fetal­dignity?­
Chervenak and McCullough point out that there has been a long-standing debate 
about whether or not the human fetus has independent moral status (“Ethics of Fetal 
Surgery,” Clinics in Perinatology, June 2009). As in many other debates, there has 
never­been­a­definitive­answer­to­the­question­that­settles­the­matter­once­and­for­
all to the satisfaction of all parties. Those in a given theological tradition disagree 
with those in others and often disagree among themselves as well. In a similar way, 
philosophy offers many different methodologies which lead to different conclusions 
about the issue, so reasonable people still disagree about whether the fetal human 
being should be accorded basic human rights.1 So Chervenak and McCullough hold 
that the only rational course of action is to abandon the debate about whether or not 
the human fetus is a patient with independent moral status, and to pursue a question 
that they think is answerable, namely, whether the fetal human being has depen-
dent moral status. In “Ethics of Fetal Surgery” they write, “A philosophically more 
sound and clinically more useful line of ethical reasoning is that the moral status 
of the fetus depends on whether it is reliably expected later to achieve the relatively 
1 Laurence B. McCullough and Frank A. Chervenak, Ethics in Obstetrics and Gyne‑
cology­(New­York:­Oxford­University­Press,­1994):­97–101.
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unambiguous moral status of becoming a child and, still later, the more unambigu-
ous moral status of becoming a person. This is called the dependent moral status 
of the fetus.” On McCullough and Chervenak’s view, the human being in utero has 
dignity when viable and when the pregnant woman presents herself to the doctor in 
order to secure help for the human fetus. 
This proposal to shelve the debate about the independent worth and focus on 
dependent status fails for a number of reasons. First, the view of McCullough and 
Chervenak is self-defeating. They themselves presuppose a particular methodology, 
a methodology that is not universally accepted. So if we ought to abandon projects 
that do not make use of a universally accepted methodology, they too should aban-
don their project. 
Second, the McCullough–Chervenak position rests on feigned neutrality. It is 
possible to be agnostic in theory about the value of human life in utero, but it is not 
possible to be agnostic in practice when one is treating fetal human beings. A physi-
cian treating a pregnant woman must either act as if the human being in utero is a 
second patient with independent worth or not. It is grossly irresponsible to “shelve” 
the question of the moral status of the fetal human being because a physician treat-
ing a pregnant patient who has asked for medical action affecting the unborn must 
act in one way or the other. If the physician harms the fetal human being, he or she 
gives a practical answer (whatever the theoretical stance) that the human fetus has 
no independent value.
McCullough and Chervenak assert that the fetal human being has dependent 
status when and only when he or she is viable and the pregnant woman presents 
herself to the physician and asks for treatment for her unborn child. McCullough 
and Chervenak present no argument for the importance of viability for moral worth. 
The­thesis­is­simply­asserted,­the­definition­of­viability­is­explained­a­bit,­and­the­
conclusion is reasserted. 
However, viability is irrelevant to moral status. In cases of conjoined twins, one 
twin may be physiologically dependent on another, and yet no one questions whether 
conjoined twins have equal basic dignity to other persons. Furthermore, viability 
varies according to access to technology, but it is absurd to say that the moral worth 
(even the dependent moral worth) of a person varies according to the person’s loca-
tion—that is, whether the person is near a hospital or far away.2 The ability to live 
in one location rather than another is irrelevant to moral status. 
McCullough and Chervenak do give an argument for why the decision of the 
woman is relevant to whether or not the fetus is a patient, namely, that independent 
moral status arises later and will not be possible without the decision of the woman 
to­continue­the­pregnancy:­“This­is­because­the­only­link­between­a­previable­fetus­
and its later achieving moral status as a child, and then a person, is the pregnant 
woman’s autonomy, exercised in the decision not to terminate her pregnancy, because 
technologic factors do not exist that can sustain the previable fetus ex utero. When the 
2 For more on this topic, see section 4.1.2 of my book The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s 
Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice­(New­York:­Routledge,­2011).­
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pregnant woman decides not to terminate her pregnancy and when the previable fetus 
and pregnant woman are presented to the physician, the previable fetus is a patient.” 
This argument is unsound. It is false that the only link between a previable fetus 
and its later achievement of moral status is the choice of the woman. If by “link” 
they­mean­a­necessary­(but­not­sufficient)­condition,­they­are­correct­that­a­necessary­
condition for a child’s reaching the age of two is that the mother does not abort him 
or her, but they are incorrect in claiming that this is the only condition. Other links, 
understood in this sense, include that the child does not die of natural causes prior 
to two years of age, that the child is not killed shortly after birth, and that a forced 
abortion is not performed, among many others. If we understand the “link” of a 
woman’s­choice­not­to­have­an­abortion­as­a­sufficient­condition,­similar­problems­
arise. Since Chervenak and McCollough’s argument rests on a false premise, it does 
not justify their conclusion.
Chervenak­and­McCollough’s­ treatment­of­ fetal­ surgery­ is­flawed­ in­other­
ways as well. They write,
To protect the woman from being coerced, her husband or partner and other 
family members should be reminded that although they may have strong 
views for or against her participation, their role should be to support and 
respect the woman’s decision-making process and its outcome. Their rela-
tionship to her is primarily one of obligation to respect and support her 
decision. Family members do not have the right to make decisions for her. 
When necessary, this aspect of the informed consent process should be made 
clear to family members. Clinical investigators should ensure that every-
one involved in the consent process takes a strictly nondirective approach. 
Although not currently required in federal consent regulations, prospective 
monitoring of the consent process (eg, in random sampling) could be used to 
enforce the nondirective approach. 
Chervenak­and­McCollough­offer­no­justification­for­any­of­these­controversial­claims.­
It is true in current U.S. law that the woman has the legal right to make the decision 
to abort. Whether or not she also has the moral right to fetal homicide (as performed 
in a pregnancy “reduction”) remains a topic of vigorous disagreement. Legally, there 
is no obligation whatsoever for family members or anyone else for that matter to 
refrain from voicing their opinions about her contemplated choice as much as they 
like.­At­least­in­the­United­States,­the­first­amendment­of­the­Constitution­protects­
free-speech rights, which are not rescinded in family relationships or when one takes 
the Hippocratic Oath. In ethical terms, there is simply no obligation “to support and 
respect” someone else’s decision, whatever that decision may be. If a decision is an 
ethically permissible or commendable one, then it should be respected and supported. 
If a decision is an ethically impermissible one, it should be neither respected nor sup-
ported. The person who makes the decision should be respected and supported, as 
is appropriate for all persons with dignity, but not the decision itself. Clear-headed 
people have no obligation to support and respect ethically wrong decisions, such as 
the­decision­to­drive­under­the­influence.­Love­and­respect­for­others,­including­the­
potential drunk driver, demands that we seek ways to help them avoid wrongful 
choices, including in many circumstances trying to talk them out of it. 
On a positive note, Chervenak and McCollough are correct in noting how fetal 
homicide­impedes­scientific­research:­“From­the­perspective­of­investigators,­to­obtain­
792
The nATionAl cATholic bioeThics QuArTerly  WinTer 2011
3 J.­L.­A.­Garcia,­“The­Doubling­Undone?­Double­Effect­in­Recent­Medical­Ethics,”­
Philosophical Papers­36.2­(2007):­245–270,­original­emphasis.
the cleanest results about outcomes for fetuses and future children, one would not 
want any pregnancies in which fetal surgery occurred to result in elective abortions.” 
In­his­article­“Fetal­Therapy:­Practical­Ethical­Considerations,”­Yves Ville makes the 
same­observation:­“Owing­to­the­high­incidence­of­TOP­[termination­of­pregnancy]­
following prenatal diagnosis of these conditions, comparative studies are going to 
be­difficult­to­perform”­(Prenatal Diagnosis, July 2011). 
In this discussion, TOP is a favored term, but this is unfortunate, because 
 “termination of pregnancy” (TOP) is ambiguous and euphemistic. It is ambiguous 
because vaginal birth, cesarean section, and spontaneous miscarriage also  “terminate” 
a pregnancy and because abortion can take place in cases where no “termination of 
pregnancy” occurs, as in the fetal homicide of one twin when the other twin is left 
alive. The acronym TOP is euphemistic because, even more than the phrase “termina-
tion of pregnancy,” it sounds benign, innocent, and noncontroversial. The reality is 
better conveyed by the more accurate, honest, and precise term “abortion.” 
Ville raises other ethical questions about fetal surgery. He notes a certain bias 
among practitioners for giving treatments, which may not be in the patient’s best 
interest:­“Offering­treatment­for­a­fetus­demonstrating­objective­signs­for­an­irrevers-
ibly­poor­outcome­is­questionable­in­that­the­benefit­of­treatment­can­be­expected­to­
be little if any and medical enthusiasm may also be strengthened with the view to 
improve one’s own practice with the procedure.” A surgeon’s desire to strengthen 
surgical­skills­or­pioneer­new­techniques­may­come­into­conflict­with­providing­
what is best for both patients.
Ville­also­claims­that­“prenatal­diagnosis­is­the­only­field­of­medicine­in­which­
termination has a role in the management of a disease.” This is false, because “termi-
nation” of a patient is not management of a disease. As Jorge Garcia points out in his 
judicious discussion of physician-assisted suicide, killing is not the relieving of pain. 
Garcia’s­reflections­can­be­extended­to­also­show­that­killing­is­not­managing­a­disease:­
Ending­[a­patient’s]­pain­cannot­be­a­benefit­to­her­for­the­usual­reason,­then,­
because [in physician-assisted suicide] the patient does not experience relief 
and thereafter live pain-free. As the end of her pain here does not improve her 
experience, neither does it improve her life, her condition. Rather, she (her 
integrated human life) ends along with the pain, and she is in no condition 
at all during the period when she is lifeless. We cannot, then, meaningfully 
compare it with her condition over the same time had she lived. . . . Thus, it is 
difficult­to­see­just­what­benefit­our­killing­renders­her,­as­it­improves neither 
her experience, nor her life, nor her condition.3 
Just as killing people to relieve their pain is not pain relief, so too abortion is not 
management­or­cure­of­disease.­Indeed,­if­we­define­disease­as­a­lack­of­proper­bio-
logical functioning to a greater or lesser degree, fetal killing induces the maximum 
of disease, complete nonfunctioning. 
About fetal moral status Ville writes, “Although the concept of the fetal  status 
gaining more independence from its mother with gestational age is universally 
accepted, its importance is to be balanced with other issues, including maternal safety 
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as well as the severity of the fetal condition.” However, it is not universally accepted 
that fetal status is linked to gestational age such that the more physiologically devel-
oped the fetus becomes, the greater the value the fetal human being has. This gradualist 
or developmental view of the value of human life prior to birth is controversial and is 
rejected by many people on a variety of grounds. Obviously, those who oppose fetal 
homicide because all human life has equal basic value reject the view that fetal worth 
develops in the course of pregnancy.4 But many of the most prominent supporters 
of abortion, such as Peter Singer, Michael Tooley, David Boonin, and Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, also reject this view. Ville offers no argument for this view, but simply 
assumes­without­justification­that­the­developmental­view­is­obviously­true.­
Indeed, Ville’s view of fetal status is inconsistent. He writes, 
The issue of fetal analgesia touches on the surgical approach itself inasmuch 
as on the “primum non nocere” principle in all procedures invasive to the 
fetus itself. It is well established that very preterm neonates experience pain, 
and related autonomic neural connections function from around 22 weeks of 
gestation. It is therefore important that any directly invasive fetal procedure 
be preceded by appropriate fetal analgesia. . . . Practitioners who undertake 
termination of pregnancy at 24 weeks or later should also consider the require-
ments for fetal analgesia or sedation prior to feticide before inducing labor. 
This approach surely does not work. If a fetal human being should not be harmed 
(primum non nocere), it is true that this principle requires the use of analgesia for 
operations in which the human being in utero may suffer, but a fortiori it is also 
true­that­the­more­significant­harm­of­death­should­not­be­inflicted.­The­primum non 
nocere principle either applies to the unborn or it does not. 
This disjunction is also apparent in twin pregnancies. The “reduction” of a preg-
nancy from twins to a single baby is controversial even among those who otherwise 
staunchly defend fetal homicide. Responding to a New York Times Magazine story 
by Ruth Padawer that raised the issue in public awareness, William Saletan’s article 
in Slate, “Flaws in Pro-Choice Logic,” puts the spotlight squarely on the problem for 




are “activated eggs.” A fetus you want is a baby; a fetus you don’t want is a 
pregnancy. Under federal law, anyone who injures or kills a “child in utero” 
during a violent crime gets the same punishment as if he had injured or killed 
“the unborn child’s mother,” but no such penalty applies to “an abortion for 
which the consent of the pregnant woman . . . has been obtained.” Reduction 
destroys this distinction. It combines, in a single pregnancy, a wanted and an 
4 For­a­philosophical­justification­for­the­equal­basic­worth­of­all­human­beings,­see­my­
Ethics of Abortion; on the developmental view and why it is mistaken, see section 4.3. See too 
my article “Equal Rights, Unequal Wrongs,” First Things­204­(August–September­2011):­21–23.
5 Ruth Padawer, “The Two-Minus-One Pregnancy,” New York Times Magazine, August 10, 
2011,­ http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/magazine/the-two-minus-one-pregnancy.html.­
William Saletan, “Flaws in Pro-Choice Logic,” National Post,­August­17,­2011,­http://fullcomment 
.nationalpost.com/2011/08/17/william-saletan-the-flaws-in-pro-choice-logic/.­
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unwanted fetus. In the case of identical twins, even their genomes are indis-
tinguishable. You can’t pretend that one is precious and the other is just tissue. 
Killing one twin in utero while letting the other live brings into full consciousness the 
doublethink that is usually merely implicit, revealing no minor cognitive dissonance. 
One­final­question­about­fetal­surgery­is­the­ethics­of­umbilical­cord occlusion 
in cases of twin–twin transference syndrome.6 In such cases, the twins are connected 
by a shared placenta. One of the twins is dying (from imminent, irreversible cardiac 
failure,­for­example),­but­the­other­twin­is­healthy.­When­the­first­twin­dies,­the­other­
twin has a high risk of death or permanent, serious neurological injury. 
Is it morally permissible to perform umbilical cord occlusion to prevent the 
dying­ twin­from­bringing­about­ the­death­or­serious­ injury­of­ the­healthy­ twin?­
Umbilical cord occlusion cuts off the circulatory link between the twins, preventing 
the dying twin from harming the healthy twin, but at the same time it cuts off the 
life-supporting link of the dying twin to the placenta. The one action brings about 
two effects, one good and the other bad. In terms of double-effect reasoning, the 
question­in­part­is­the­following:­Is­umbilical­cord­occlusion­selective­feticide­or­is­
it­the­foreseen­but­not­intended­death­of­one­twin­to­save­the­other­twin?
Supposing for the sake of argument that the death of the weaker twin is not 
desired as a means or an end in itself, and that the fourth condition of double-effect 
reasoning is met, namely, that there is a just cause for allowing the evil effect. My 
view­is­that­the­justification­or­condemnation­of­umbilical­cord­occlusion­depends­on­
how one understands the distinction between intended effects and merely foreseen 
effects. If all the certain or simultaneous effects of the action are intended, then 
according to double-effect reasoning, it is impermissible to bring about the negative 
effect—specifically,­fetal­demise­following­umbilical­cord­occlusion.­Although­others­
would disagree with me, it is my opinion, however, that if the intended effects are 
understood to be limited to what is chosen as a means or an end, as part of the plan, 
or as desired effects,7 then umbilical cord occlusion would be permissible according 
to double-effect reasoning, despite its certain and simultaneous negative effect of 
accelerating the death of the dying twin. It is permissible to not prevent the foreseen 
death of one person in order to save the life of another. 
Fetal surgery doubtless gives rise to other ethical issues as well, but twin–twin 
transfusion­syndrome­is­among­the­most­difficult.­Without­a­cogent­answer­to­the­
questions of fetal dignity and reduction of pregnancy, the likelihood of coming to a 
just solution in cases of twin–twin transfusion syndrome is remote.
chrisTopher KAczor
6 For the medical background, see, for example, Ramen H. Chmait and Ruben A. Quin-
tero,­“Operative­Fetoscopy­in­Complicated­Monochorionic­Twins:­Current­Status­and­Future­
Direction,” Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynecology 20.2­(April­2008):­169–174;­and­
A.­Cristina­Rossi­and­Vincenzo­D’Addario,­“Umbilical­Cord­Occlusion­for­Selective­Feti-
cide­in­Complicated­Monochorionic­Twins:­A­Systematic­Review­of­Literature,”­American 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 200.2­(February­2009):­123–129.­
7 See,­ for­example,­ John­Finnis,­Germain­Grisez,­and­Joseph­Boyle,­“‘Direct’­and­
‘Indirect’:­A­Reply­to­Critics­of­Our­Action­Theory,”­The Thomist 65.1­(January­2001):­1–44.
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Journals in PhilosoPhy  
and Theology
Volume 25, Number 4 
May 2011
The Virtue Ethics Approach 
to Bioethics
S. Holland
This paper discusses the viability of a virtue-
based approach to bioethics. Virtue ethics 
is clearly appropriate to addressing issues 
of professional character and conduct. But 
another major remit of bioethics is to evalu-
ate the ethics of biomedical  procedures in 
order to recommend regulatory policy. How 
 appropriate is the virtue ethics approach 
to­fulfilling­ this­remit?­The­first­part­of­
this­ ­paper­characterizes­the­methodology­
problem in bioethics in terms of diversity, 
and shows that virtue ethics does not  simply 
 restate this problem in its own terms. How-
ever, fatal objections to the way the virtue 
ethics approach is typically taken in bioethics 
literature are presented in the second section 
of the paper. In the third part, a virtue-based 
approach to bioethics that avoids the short-
comings of the typical one is introduced and 
shown to be prima facie plausible. The  upshot 
is an inviting new direction for  research into 
bioethics’ methodology.
Volume 25, Number 5 
June 2011
The Dead Donor Rule, Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia, and Capital Punishment
C. Coons and N. Levin
We argue that the dead donor rule, which 
states that multiple vital organs should only 
be taken from dead patients, is justified 
neither in principle nor in practice. We use 
a thought experiment and a guiding assump-
tion­in­the­literature­about­the­justification­of­
moral principles to undermine the theoreti-
cal­justification­for­the­rule.­We­then­offer­
two real world analogues to this thought 
experiment, voluntary active  euthanasia 
and capital punishment, and argue that the 
moral permissibility of terminating any 
patient through the removal of vital organs 
cannot turn on whether or not the practice 
violates the dead donor rule. Next, we con-
sider practical justifications for the dead 
donor­rule.­Specifically,­we­consider­whether­
there are compelling reasons to promulgate 
the rule even though its corresponding 
moral­principle­is­not­theoretically­justified.­
We argue that there are no such reasons. 
In fact, we  argue that promulgating the 
rule may actually decrease public trust in 
 organ  procurement procedures and medical 
 institutions generally—even in states that do 
not permit capital punishment or voluntary 
active euthanasia. Finally, we examine our 
case against the dead donor rule in the light 
of­common­arguments­for­it.­We­find­that­
these arguments are often misplaced—they 
do not support the dead donor rule. Instead, 
they support the quite different rule that 
patients should not be killed for their vital 
organs.
Bioethics
Clinics in  
Perinatology
Volume 36, Number 2 
June 2009
Ethics of Fetal Surgery
F. A. Chervenak and L. B. McCullough
This article provides a comprehensive 
 approach to the ethics of clinical investiga-
tion of fetal surgery. Investigators should 
 address the initiation and assessment of clini-
cal trials to determine whether they establish 
a standard of care and use an appropriate in-
formed consent process to recruit and enroll 
subjects, consider whether selection criteria 
should include the abortion preferences of 
the pregnant woman, and consider whether 
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physicians have an obligation to offer refer-
ral to such investigation. This approach is 
comprehensive because it takes account of 
the physician’s obligations to the fetal pa-
tient, the pregnant woman, and future fetal 
and pregnant patients. The comprehensive 
approach to the ethics of fetal surgery is 
applied to the example of in utero surgical 
management­of­spina­bifida.
Volume 35, Number 5 
May 2009
Is There A Duty to Share 
Genetic Information? 
S. M. Liao
A number of prominent bioethicists, such as 
Parker, Lucassen and Knoppers, have called 
for the adoption of a system in which by 
default genetic information is shared among 
family members. This paper suggests that 
a main reason given in support of this call 
to share genetic information among family 
members is the idea that genetic informa-
tion is essentially familial in nature. On 
examining this “familial nature of genetics” 
argument, the paper shows that most genetic 
information is only shared in a weaker way 
among family members and does not nec-
essarily lead to the actual manifestation of 
particular diseases. The upshot is that the 
idea that genetic information is familial in 
nature­does­not­provide­sufficient­ground­
for moving towards a system in which by 
default genetic information is shared among 
family members.
Volume 37, Number 1 
Spring 2009
The Vulnerability of the Very Sick
J. Menikoff
When seriously ill patients for whom exist-
ing treatments are inadequate are invited to 
participate in clinical trials that offer a new 
treatment, should those persons be consid-
Journal of Law,  
Medicine and Ethics




article attempts to provide some answers.
Volume 37, Number 2 
February 2011
Ethical Challenges in Fetal Surgery
A. Smajdor
Fetal surgery has been practised for some 
decades now. However, it remains a highly 
complex area, both medically and ethi-
cally. This paper shows how the routine 
use of  ultrasound has been a catalyst for 
fetal surgery, in creating new needs and 
new  incentives for intervention. Some of 
the needs met by fetal surgery are those 
of parents and clinicians who experience 
stress while waiting for the birth of a fetus 
with known anomalies. The paper suggests 
that the role of technology and visualisation 
techniques in creating and meeting such 
new needs is ethically problematic. It then 
 addresses the idea that fetal surgery should 
be restricted to interventions that are life- 
saving for the fetus, arguing that this restric-
tion is unduly paternalistic. Fetal surgery 
poses challenges for an autonomy-based 
system of ethics. However, it is risky to cir-
cumvent these challenges by restricting the 
choices open to pregnant women, even when 
these choices appear excessively altruistic.
Volume 36, Number 10 
October 2010
Decapitation and the 
Definition of Death
F. G. Miller and R. D. Truog
Although established in the law and current 
practice, the determination of death accord-
ing to neurological criteria  continues to be 
controversial. Some scholars have  advocated 
return to the traditional  circulatory and respi-
ratory criteria for determining death because 
individuals diagnosed as ‘brain dead’ display 
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Journal of Medicine  
and Philosophy
an extensive range of  integrated biologi-
cal functioning with the aid of  mechanical 
 ventilation. Others have  attempted to  refute 
this stance by appealing to the analogy 
between decapitation and brain death. 
Since a decapitated animal is obviously 
dead, and ‘brain death’ represents physi-
ological  decapitation, brain dead  individuals 
must be dead. In this article we  refute 
this  ‘decapitation gambit.’ We argue that 
 decapitated animals are not necessarily dead, 
and that, moreover, the analogy  between 
decapitation and the  clinical syndrome of 
brain­death­is­flawed.
Volume 34, Number 1 
February 2009
Brain Damage and the 
Moral Significance of Consciousness
G. Kahane and J. Savulescu
Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged 
patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state 
suggest that the patients might be conscious. 
This might seem to raise no new ethical ques-
tions given that in related disputes both sides 
agree that evidence for consciousness gives 
strong reason to preserve life. We question 
this assumption. We clarify the widely held 
but obscure principle that consciousness is 
morally­significant.­It­is­hard­to­apply­this­
principle to difficult­cases­given­that­philoso-
phers of mind distinguish between a range of 
notions of consciousness and that is unclear 
which of these is assumed by the principle. 
We suggest that the morally relevant notion 
is that of phenomenal consciousness and then 
use our analysis to interpret cases of brain 
damage. We argue that enjoyment of con-
sciousness might actually give stronger moral 
reasons not to preserve a patient’s life and, 
indeed, that these might be stronger when 
patients­retain­significant cognitive function.
Volume 36, Number 3 
July 2011
Confronting Moral Pluralism in 
Posttraditional Western Societies: 
Bioethics Critically Reassessed
H. T. Engelhardt
In the face of the moral pluralism that results 
from the death of God and the abandon-
ment of a God’s eye perspective in secular 
philosophy, bioethics arose in a context that 
renders it essentially incapable of giving 
answers to substantive moral questions, such 
as concerning the permissibility of abortion, 
human embryonic stem cell research, eutha-
nasia, etc. Indeed, it is only when bioethics 
understands its own limitations and those 
of secular moral philosophy in general can 
it better appreciate those tasks that it can 
actually usefully perform in both the clinical 
and academic setting. It is the task of this 
Volume 33, Number 2 
April 2008
Four Queries concerning 
the Metaphysics of 
Early Human Embryogenesis
A. A. Howsepian
In this essay, I attempt to provide answers 
to the following four queries concerning 
the metaphysics of early human embryo-
genesis.­Following­its­first­cellular­fission,­
is it coherent to claim that one and only 
one of two “blastomeric” twins of a human 
zygote­is­identical­with­that­zygote?­Follow-
ing the fusion of two human pre-embryos, 
is it coherent to claim that one and only one 
pre-fusion pre-embryo is identical with that 
postfusion­pre-embryo?­Does­a­live­human­
being come into existence only when its 
brain­comes­into­existence?­At­implantation,­
does a pre-embryo become a mere part of 
its­mother?­I­argue­that­either­if­things­have­
quidditative properties or if criterialism is 
false, then queries and can be answered in 
the­affirmative;­that­in­light­of­recent­devel-
opments in theories of human death and in 
light of a more “functional” theory of brains, 
query can be answered in the negative; and 
that plausible mereological principles require 
a negative answer to query.
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Will Neuroscientific Discoveries about 
Free Will and Selfhood Change Our 
Ethical Practices?
C. Kaposy
Over the past few years, a number of authors 
in­the­new­field­of­neuroethics­have­claimed­
that there is an ethical challenge presented 
by­the­likelihood­that­the­findings­of­neu-
roscience will undermine many common 
assumptions about human agency and self-
hood. These authors claim that neuroscience 
shows that human agents have no free will, 
and that our sense of being a “self” is an 
illusory construction of our brains. Further-
more, some commentators predict that our 
ethical practices of assigning moral blame, or 
of­recognizing­others­as­persons­rather­than­
as objects, will change as a result of neurosci-
entific­discoveries­that­debunk­free­will­and­
the concept of the self. I contest suggestions 
that neuroscience’s conclusions about the 
illusory nature of free will and the self will 
cause­significant­change­in­our­practices.­I­
argue that we have self-interested reasons 
to resist allowing neuroscience to determine 
core beliefs about ourselves.
paper to understand and reevaluate  bioethics 
by understanding these limits. Academic 
bioethicists­can­analyze­ideas,­concepts,­and­
claims necessary to understanding the moral 
questions raised in health care, assessing 
the arguments related to these issues, and 
provide an understanding of the different 
moral perspectives on bioethical issues. In 
the clinical setting, bioethicists can provide 
legal advice, serve as experts on IRBs, medi-
ating disputes, facilitating decision-making 
and risk management, and clarifying nor-
mative issues. However, understanding this 
is only possible when one understands the 
history, genesis, and foundations of bioeth-
ics and its inability to provide a resolution to 
 postmodern moral pluralism.
Volume 146, Number 2 
November 2009
The Loop Case and Kamm’s 
Doctrine of Triple Effect
S. M. Liao 
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Loop Case is 
particularly­significant­in­normative­ethics­
because it calls into question the valid-
ity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of 
Double Effect, according to which there is a 
significant­difference­between­harm­that­is­
intended and harm that is merely foreseen 
and not intended. Recently, Frances Kamm 
Volume 18, Number 2 
June 2008
A Proposed Ethical Framework 
for Vaccine Mandates: 
Competing Values and 
the Case of HPV
R. I. Field and A. L. Caplan
Debates over vaccine mandates raise  intense 
emotions,­as­reflected­in­the­current­contro-
versy over whether to mandate the vaccine 
against human papilloma virus (HPV), the 
virus that can cause cervical cancer. Public 
health ethics so far has failed to facilitate 
meaningful dialogue between the opposing 
sides. When stripped of its emotional charge, 
the debate can be framed as a contest  between 
competing ethical  values. This framework 
can­be­conceptualized­graphically­as­a­
conflict­between­autonomy­on­the­one­hand,­
which militates against government intru-
sion,­and­beneficence,­utilitarianism,­justice,­
and­nonmaleficence­on­the­other,­which­may­
lend support to intervention. When applied 
to the HPV vaccine, this framework would 
support a mandate based on utilitarianism, 
if certain conditions are met and if herd 
 immunity is a realistic objective.
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duty of competence moving the boundaries 
between experimental surgery, therapeutic 
innovation and standard care. In addition, 
the technical success of a fetal intervention 
can only rarely fully predict the postnatal 
outcome. Managing uncertainty regarding 
long-term morbidity and the possibility for 
fetal therapy to change the risk of perinatal 
death into that of severe handicap remains a 
critical factor affecting women’s choice for 
TOP as an alternative to fetal therapy.
has argued that what she calls the Doctrine of 
Triple Effect (DTE), which draws a distinc-
tion between acting because-of and acting 
in-order-to, can account for our judgment 
about­the­Loop­Case.­In­this­paper,­I­first­
argue that even if the distinction drawn by 
DTE can be sustained, it does not seem to 
apply to the Loop Case. Moreover, I question 
whether this distinction has any normative 
significance.­The­upshot­is­that­I­am­skepti-
cal that DTE can explain our judgment about 
the Loop Case.





Progress in prenatal diagnosis can lead to 
the diagnosis of severe fetal abnormali-
ties for which natural history anticipates a 
fatal outcome or the development of severe 
disability despite optimal postnatal care. 
Intrauterine therapy can be offered in these 
selected cases. Prenatal diagnosis is the only 
field­of­medicine­in­which­termination­is­an­
option in the management of severe diseases. 
Fetal therapy has therefore developed as 
an alternative to fatalist expectant prenatal 
management as well as to termination of 
pregnancy (TOP). There are few standards 
of fetal care that have gone beyond the stage 
of equipoise and even fewer have been 
 established based on appropriate studies 
comparing pre- and postnatal care. Several 
ethical questions are being raised as fetal sur-
gery develops, including basic Hippocratic 
principles of patients’ autonomy and doctors’ 
Prenatal Diagnosis
Utilitas
Volume 23, Number 2 
May 2011
Twinning and Fusion as Arguments 
against the Moral Standing of 
the Early Human Embryo
M. Ramsay
Some philosophers argue that, because it 
is subject to twinning and fusion, the early 
 human embryo cannot hold strong moral 
standing. Supposedly, the fact that an early 
human embryo can twin or fuse with another 
embryo entails that it is not a distinct indi-
vidual, thus precluding it from holding any 
level of moral standing. I argue that appeals 
to twinning and fusion fail to show that the 
early human embryo is not a distinct individ-
ual and that these appeals do not provide us 
with plausible reasons for denying the strong 
moral standing of the early human embryo. 
I­recognize­one­possible­exception­to­this­
general assessment, a particular version of the 
appeal to fusion. Embryo fusion that results 
in tetragametic chimerism provides some 
reason for doubting the early human embryo’s 
moral standing. But twinning and fusion are 
otherwise irrelevant in this context.
